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Abstract   It is widely known that Black Americans are significantly more likely 
to be killed by the police in the USA than white Americans. What is less widely 
known is that nearly half of all people killed by the police are people with 
disabilities. The aim of this paper is to better understand the intersection of racism 
and ableism in the United States. Contributing to the growing literature at the 
intersection of philosophy of disability and critical philosophy of race, I argue that 
theories concerning white supremacy should take more seriously the way in 
which it functions as a process and apparatus of making abled and disabled. I 
conclude by discussing the ways in which understanding white supremacy in this 
manner is a valuable coalitional tool in fights for social justice more generally. 
 
Keywords.  Philosophy of Disability, Critical Philosophy of Race, Ableism, 
Racism, White Supremacy 
  
 
1 The impetus for this paper arose out of rich and provocative conversations with Lauren Guilmette 
and Axelle Karerra as well as a course I had the honor of auditing at Emory University by George 
Yancy called “Philosophy, Whiteness, and Identity.” I want to also thank a number of other people 
who generously discussed (and certainly improved) the ideas explored in this paper with me: 
Tommy J. Curry, Ryan Fics, José Mendoza, George Fourlas, Alia Al-Saji, Bryan Mukandi, Andrea 
Pitts, William Paris, Becca Longtin, David Peña-Guzmán, Jennifer Scuro, Devonya Havis, and 
Amelia Wirts. Also, many thanks for feedback from the 2019 audiences of the Society for 
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy and of McGill University’s Workshop on Critical 
Philosophy of Race, where earlier versions of this paper were presented. Lastly, thanks to the 
anonymous reviewers for helpful responses, comments, and critiques. All remaining infelicities 
are, of course, my own. 
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“The record is there for all to read. It resounds all over the 
world. It might as well be written in the sky. One wishes that 
Americans, white Americans, would read, for their own sakes, 
this record, and stop defending themselves against it…the fact 
that they have not yet been able to do this—to face their history, 
to change their lives—hideously menaces this country. Indeed, it 
menaces the entire world.” 
—James Baldwin2 
 
“The marginalization of disabled people is due not to a lack of 
determination or hard work or courage but due to pervasive and 
persistent economic, political, and social exclusions.” 
—Alison Kafer3 
 
As the policies of the new Jim Crow and Juan Crow4 continue to gain 
steam at state and federal levels and as white supremacy is on the rise, the 
stakes of analyzing, understanding, and better responding to the complex 
intertwining of ableism and anti-Black racism could hardly be higher in 
the United States.5 It is well known that police killings in the USA 
disproportionately affect people of color. According to information from 
the FBI gathered in 2012, Black people in particular accounted for 31 
percent of police killing victims, even though they make up just 13 percent 
of the US population.6 More recent numbers are actively reported by The 
Washington Post on their ongoing “Fatal Force” page.7  
 
Yet, in 2017, a report by the Ruderman Family Foundation brought to 
light an additional fact too rarely addressed or analyzed in discussions, 
debates, and protests concerning police killings: “roughly a third to a half of 
 
2 James Baldwin, Collected Essays (New York: Library of America, 1998), 722. 
3 Alison Kafer, Feminist, Queer, Crip (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2013), 93. 
There are longstanding and heated debates over language use concerning disability. I will here use 
the language preferred by the majority of disability rights activists in the United States since at 
least the 1960s: “people with disabilities.” This trend is admittedly shifting, but there is no genuine 
consensus at this point in time. 
4 José Jorge Mendoza, “Doing Away with Juan Crow: Two Standards for Just Immigration 
Reform,” APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 15 (2):14-20 (2015) 
5 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, Revised 
edition / ed. (New York; Tennessee: New Press, 2012); George Yancy, Backlash: What Happens When 
We Talk Honestly About Racism in America (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018). 
6 Dara Lind, “The FBI is trying to get better data on police killings. Here's what we know now.” 
Vox. Accessed September 1, 2019. https://www.vox.com/2014/8/21/6051043/how-many-people-
killed-police-statistics-homicide-official-black. 
7 The Washington Post, “Fatal Force,” accessed March 12, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-2019/. 
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all people killed by police are disabled.”8 For well over a decade, more people 
with intellectual disabilities categorized as “mental illnesses” have been 
incarcerated in jails and prisons than treated in hospitals or other medical 
facilities by a factor of at least three, returning us to the explicit practices 
of institutionalization from the 1840s onward. This also returns us to the 
routine criminalization of multiple types of intellectual disability as they 
intersect with practices and ideologies of racialization.9 Keeping this 
intersection in mind, in the United States people with disabilities are two 
and a half times as likely to experience violence than nondisabled people,10 
and people with intellectual disabilities are significantly more likely to 
face the death penalty than neurotypical people.11 
 
There is a relatively small, yet growing body of scholarship at the 
intersection of critical philosophy of race, critical disability studies, and 
philosophy of disability, much of which seeks to understand the specific 
intersection of ableism and anti-black racism in the context of the United 
States. However, many of these authors are working across disciplines, 
traditions, and methodologies, leading discussions and debates to 
sometimes omit relevant scholarship, repeat old work, misrepresent 
various claims, or overlap in unhelpful ways.12 Because of this situation, 
 
8 David M. Perry and Lawrence Carter Long, “The Ruderman White Paper on Media Coverage of 
Law Enforcement Use of Force and Disability,” Ruderman Family Foundation, 
http://rudermanfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/MediaStudy-PoliceDisability_final-
final.pdf. 
9 This is based upon data culled between 2004 and 2005. E. Fuller Torrey et al., “More Mentally Ill 
Persons Are in Jails and Prisons Than Hospitals: A Survey of the States,” (Alexandria, VA: National 
Sheriffs Association, 2010). 
10 Debra McKinney, “The Invisible Hate Crime,” Southern Poverty Law Center, 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2018/invisible-hate-crime. 
11 Michael L. Perlin, Mental Disability and the Death Penalty: The Shame of the States (Lanham, Md: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013). 
12 A non-exhaustive sample of such research would include: Tommy J. Curry, "This Nigger's 
Broken: Hyper-Masculinity, the Buck, and the Role of Physical Disability in White Anxiety toward 
the Black Male Body," Journal of Social Philosophy 48, no. 3 (2017); Christopher M. Bell, Blackness 
and Disability: Critical Examinations and Cultural Interventions, Forecaast (East Lansing: Michigan 
State University Press, 2011); "Introducing White Disability Studies: A Modest Proposal," in The 
Disability Studies Reader, ed. Lennard J. Davis (2006); Jennifer Scuro, Addressing Ableism: 
Philosophical Questions via Disability Studies. Lanham: Lexington (2014), esp. chapter 3.; Andrew 
Dilts, "Incurable Blackness: Criminal Disenfranchisement, Mental Disability, and the White 
Citizen," DSQ 32, no. 3 (2012); Mel Y. Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer 
Affect, Perverse Modernities (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012); Phil Smith, "Whitness, 
Normal Theory, and Disability Studies," DSQ 24, no. 2 (2004); Eva Feder Kittay, "Deadly Medicine: 
Project T4, Mental Disability, and Racism," Res Philosophica 93, no. 4 (2016); Susan Schweik, 
"Lomax's Matrix: Disability, Solidarity, and the Black Power of 504," DSQ 31, no. 1 (2011); Sami 
Schalk, Bodyminds Reimagined: (Dis)Ability, Race, and Gender in Black Women's Speculative 
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work at this intersection is uneven, and there is no shared interpretive 
framework for scholars hoping to move these conversations forward. In 
this paper, I work towards such a framework by arguing that white 
supremacy is a process and apparatus of making abled and disabled. 
 
In section one, I draw upon work in contemporary critical philosophy of 
race to argue that whiteness functions as a protection of settler colonialist 
privilege, a privilege that is invariably wielded via the construction, 
expansion, and safeguarding of abilities (legal, political, social, cultural, 
embodied, etc.) for those deemed white, whilst simultaneously wielded 
via the destruction, restriction, and undermining of abilities for those 
deemed non-white. In short, whiteness functions at base as a system of 
ablement and disablement or “debility,” to follow Jasbir Puar’s apt 
phrasing.13 In section two, I draw upon work in philosophy of disability 
and critical disability studies to argue that this system is operationalized 
through an understanding of human bodies as capable of ontological lack, 
 
Fiction (London: Duke University Press, 2018). Cristina Visperas, “The Able-Bodied Slave,” Journal 
of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, no. 1 (2019): 93, https://doi.org/10/ggcmwk. I would also 
point readers to the very helpful section on “Dis/ability Critical Race Studies and Black Disability 
Studies” in Melinda Hall’s entry on “Critical Disability Theory” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. There is also important legal work being done at this intersection. See, for example, 
Kimani Paul-Emile, “Blackness as Disability?,” Georgetown Law Journal 106, no. 2 (2018): 293. 
And, of course, there is certainly work being done at the intersection of Black studies/African 
American studies and disability that operates less directly in the more specific orbit of the 
intersection of critical philosophy of race, critical disability studies, and philosophy of disability. 
E.g., see Therí A. Pickens, “Blue Blackness, Black Blueness: Making Sense of Blackness and 
Disability” 50, no. 2 (2017): 93–103, https://doi.org/10/ggcmwm. In terms of non-academic 
exchanges, the discussion between disability activist and artist Leroy F. Moore Jr. and Tommy J. 
Curry is telling: “Black Disabled Men: ‘Man-Not’”, National Black Disability Coalition, Accessed 
September 9th, 2020. https://www.blackdisability.org/content/black-disabled-men-
%E2%80%9Cman-not%E2%80%9D%C2%A0. 
13 Jasbir K. Puar, The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability (2017). Cf. also Stacy Clifford 
Simplican, The Capacity Contract: Intellectual Disability and the Question of Citizenship (Minneapolis; 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2015). For simplicity and the aims at hand, I will shift 
between using the terms “disability,” “ability,” and, where appropriate, “dis/ability.” Having said 
this, I am fond of Sami Schalk’s usage of the term “(dis)ability” as way to think more 
intersectionally about what often goes under the simpler “disability.” She writes, “I use this term to 
reference the overarching social system of bodily and mental norms that includes ability and 
disability. I use (dis)ability because unlike terms such as gender, which references man, woman, 
genderqueer, transgender, and other gender identities, disability without the parenthetical 
adjustment merely references disability and impairment. The term (dis)ability also highlights the 
mutual dependency of disability and ability to define one another. While other scholars use 
dis/ability or ability/disability to similar effect, I believe the parenthetical curve as opposed to the 
backslash better visually suggests the shifting, contentious, and contextual boundaries between 
disability and ability.” Schalk, Bodyminds Reimagined, 6. 
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which is to say, as de facto and de jure capable of being less than human.14 I 
close by expanding on the claim that critical analyses of race that do not 
attend to questions of disability and debility as well as critical analyses of 
disability that do not attend to questions of race and racialization are 
doomed to theoretical and empirical oversights.15 
I.  The Birth of the Racial-Disabled Subject 
Moving from national statistics concerning the relationship between 
disability and race vis-à-vis police encounters as a whole, consider the 
following: the ACLU reports that “students with disabilities are 3 times 
more likely than students without disabilities to be referred to law 
enforcement. Black girls with disabilities are 3.33 times more likely to be 
referred to law enforcement, and Black boys with disabilities are 4.58 
times more likely to be referred to law enforcement.”16 Tommy Curry, 
keeping such statistics front and center, argues that “black male 
vulnerability” is so omnipresent under white supremacy that a “black 
disabled man” is a “conceptual impossibility.”17 As Curry explains, “Black 
 
14 David Livingstone Smith, Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others, 1st 
ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011).  
15 An initial caveat is in order. I by no means wish to suggest that there have not been decades of 
work to integrate disability and racial justice, specifically by people of color. As Leroy Moore, 
Talila A. Lewis, and Lydia X. Z. Brown, write in “Accountable Reporting on Disability, Race, & 
Police Violence: A Community Response to the ‘Ruderman White Paper on the Media Coverage of 
Use of Force and Disability,’” the white paper from which this paper takes its point of departure 
“does not mention or acknowledge the work of countless disabled and disability-adjacent activists 
of color on police violence, even though those most affected and most engaged in this work are 
Disabled/Deaf Black, Brown, and Indigenous people.” Moore, Lewis, and Brown list the names of 
seventy-five “activists, scholars, attorneys, organizers, artists and cultural workers, journalists, 
bloggers, philosophers, community builders and advocates” who have done and continue doing 
work to integrate disability and racial justice. One could defend the Ruderman paper by arguing 
that it sought to highlight an additional fact too rarely addressed in the national media and did not 
aim to be either exhaustive or historical in nature. I do not wish to take a stand on that dispute 
here, and my argument does not require doing so. In framing things as I do, I am hoping to 
highlight the need for further engagement with all such work and specifically so for scholars who 
are working at the narrower intersection of critical philosophy of race and philosophy of disability. 
Moore, Leroy, T. Lewis, and Lydia X. Z. Brown, 2018, “Accountable Reporting on Disability, Race, 
& Policy Violence: A Community Response to the ‘Ruderman White Paper on the Media Coverage 
of Use of Force and Disability.” Available at 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/117eoVeJVP594L6-1bgL8zpZrzgojfsveJwc WuHpkNcs/edit. 
16 Susan Mizner, “Children Cruelly Handcuffed Win Big Settlement Against the Police in 
Kentucky,” ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/blog/disability-rights/disability-rights-and-
education/children-cruelly-handcuffed-win-big. 
17 Tommy J. Curry, "This Nigger's Broken: Hyper-Masculinity, the Buck, and the Role of Physical 
Disability in White Anxiety toward the Black Male Body," Journal of Social Philosophy 48, no. 3 
(2017). Hereafter cited in text. To some, it may seem as though the focus on disabled Black men that 
follows falls uncritically in step with Curry’s own focus, offering no justification of my own. 
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men cannot be disabled because their able-body-ness is needed to fulfill 
the caricatures of theory and stereotypes. For the Black male to be a rapist, 
a super predator, he needs to be able to rape and kill. He is theorized as 
able-bodied to animate the violence others imagine of him.”18 
 
In addition to engaging large swaths of social scientific evidence, Curry 
defends this argument by looking to two primary examples: the 
September 23, 2015 police killing of Mr. Jeremey McDole by officers from 
Wilmington, Delaware and the fictional trial of Tom Robinson in Harper 
Lee’s 1960 novel To Kill a Mockingbird. In each of these cases, Curry 
astutely argues that the visible disability of the black man in question, 
McDole and Robinson, was rendered irrelevant—arguably to the point of 
invisibility—in the eyes of the white people who killed or sentenced them 
to death, respectively, as well as to the majority of commentators 
analyzing the stories.  
 
For sake of space, I am assuming that readers know the now canonical 
story of Tom Robinson. The story of Jeremey McDole is, however, sadly 
less well known. In September 2015, four Wilmington, Delaware polices 
officers shot 28-year-old Jeremy “Bam” McDole while sitting in his 
wheelchair on the city’s west side, murdering him on site. Senior 
Corporeal Joseph Dellose “fired at McDole with a shotgun approximately 
two seconds after initially ordering him to put his hands up, the report 
found, creating uncertainty among other officers who, not knowing where 
the gunfire came from, also turned their weapons on McDole… Dellose 
and the other officers were responding to a 911 call in which a resident 
told dispatchers that a man in a wheelchair had shot himself, and that he 
had a gun in his hand. Investigators later interviewed the woman who 
called 911, who said she never saw a gun.”19 
 
Indeed, I do not here offer an analysis of the intersection of ableism and racism that takes gender 
differences as a central concern. The reason I engage Curry and follow him in his own focus is 
because he provides an exceptionally potent example of how focusing on the intersection of racism 
and ableism can go well, in certain respects, and go wrong, in others, without the sort of shared 
interpretive framework for which I argue here. 
18 Tommy J. Curry, personal correspondence, August 1, 2019. See also chapter five as well as the 
conclusion of The Man-Not. {Citation} Cf. Christine Wieseler, “Challenging Conceptions of the 
‘Normal’ Subject in Phenomenology,” in Race as Phenomena: Between Phenomenology and Philosophy of 
Race (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 69–85 esp. 79-81.1/5/21 8:46:00 PM 
19 Esteban Parra, Adam Duvernay and Jessica Masulli Reyes, “McDole shooting: Wilmington police 




Drawing upon Fanon’s incisive discussions of phobogenesis, Curry 
argues, “the fear that the Black man represents—his sight, imagining him 
as a sex partner—is the origin of white violence against him” (324). Curry 
continues, “because the Black male body is confined to the realm of 
terror—a living corporeal horror—I argue the recognition of intellectual 
disability by white onlookers is subsumed by white fear. In other words, 
disability in the Black male is unrecognizable by whites because of a very 
real racial anxiety” (idem). Yet, focusing for a moment on Curry’s 
discussion of Tom Robinson, it is crucial to note that Robinson’s 
impairment was created by unsafe, highly racialized conditions of labor: 
his arm was caught in a plantation cotton gin.20 That Robinson’s disability 
was irrelevant is not only a question of the specific sexualization and 
racialization Curry details, but also because disabilities acquired through 
plantation-related labor are not “real” disabilities in the eyes of the white, 
“able-bodied” jury. That is to say, one must attend to the economic 
(racialized) aspects of disability at play in the story as well.  
 
The twinned processes of racialization and abilitation/debilitation at work 
here inform the temporal structure of disability as well.21 One could say 
that Robinson is always already disabled (in the social model’s sense) via 
the racialized epidermalization of his body. Yet, if one follows Fanon in 
understanding Blackness (heard in its relationship with colonization and 
the Middle Passage) in terms of a “non-zone of being” relative to the 
white racist, ableist, settler colonialist world, then the negativity of 
disability doubles back upon itself, rendering him neither abled, nor 
disabled because he is, in the end, seen as not human.22  Robinson’s 
“disability” is not a disability that a white person would ever have 
because it is a disability that—in the white, ableist imaginary—a white 
person could not have. In short, it conflicts with white identity.  
 
And even if a white person had the “same” disability (in the banal sense 
of the same type of physiological shape and function of one’s left arm), 
 
20 Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird, 1st Perennial Classic ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 2002). 
21 I realize that the coinage “abilitation” is awkward, but I have not found a better, concise way to 
refer to processes of “making able-bodied.” 
22 Smith, Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others; Fanon, Black Skin, 
White Masks. I have not here taken up Curry’s analysis of the role that gender plays in this active 
negation. See Tommy J. Curry, The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2017). On questions of the “temporal structures of 
racialized experience,” see Alia Al-Saji’s essay, "Too Late: Racialized Time and the Closure of the 
Past," Insights 6, no. 5 (2013). 
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they would not be disabled in the same way. There are multiple modes of 
dehumanization at play here, each reinforcing each. As Curry makes clear, 
given the way racial and gender dynamics intersect with Robinson’s 
bodily form and function, it is in fact not a question of being disabled in a 
different way, but of Robinson not being “disabled” at all in the regard of 
the white jurors. As Curry explains, “racism creates peculiar misandric 
caricatures of Black males that require sexual aggression and violence to 
function….white cultural schemas hold that the Black man is a rapist. A 
disabled Black man may be a less efficient rapist, because he is disabled, 
but he is still a rapist because he is still a Black man.”23 
 
To continue with this focus on the racialized psycho-economics of 
disability, or the disabling psycho-economics of racialization, consider 
Achille Mbembe’s argument in The Critique of Black Reason that “the birth 
of the racial subject—and therefore of Blackness—is linked to the history 
of capitalism.”24 Mbembe writes, 
 
Capitalism emerged as a double impulse toward, on the one hand, 
the unlimited violation of all forms of prohibition and, on the other, 
the abolition of any distinction between ends and means. The black 
slave, in his dark splendor, was the first racial subject: the product 
of the two impulses, the most visible symbol of the possibility of 
violence without limits and of vulnerability without a safety net. 
Capitalism is the power of capture, influence, and polarization, and 
it has always depended on racial subsidies.25 
 
That is to say, the process and apparatus of making abled and disabled 
emerges not simply out of capitalism, but out of the racial subsidies upon 
which it is based, producing the twin needs to humanize those who 
control the means of production and dehumanize those who do not and 
do so at varying levels of stratification depending upon context, locale, 
political exigency, extant social mores, etc. As Ryan Fics puts this matter, 
“disability and ability aren’t necessarily the product of capital, but, rather, 
they are co-originary with that which informs and arranges capital, 
especially the white supremacy that undergirds” its historical formation 
 
23 Tommy Curry, personal correspondence, August 1, 2019. 
24 Heeding the work of George Yancy and Linda Alcoff, among others, I imagine one hearing 
Mbembe in fact say here: “and therefore of Blackness and whiteness.” Achille Mbembe, Critique of 
Black Reason (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), 179. 
25 Idem. 
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and emergence.26 Yet another component of this co-originary logic is that 
of extermination. The extreme and systematic acts of violence and murder 
by white Americans against Black Americans has been an historical 
mainstay.27 Making Black bodies disabled and making Black bodies dead is 
at the center of the structural intertwining of ableism and anti-Black 
racism upon which this country is founded.  
 
Along with the racial subsidies upon which the power of capture, 
influence, and polarization is afforded to those who are racialized as white 
comes also the production of social identity. When James Baldwin claims 
that whiteness must be seen in terms of the “protection of…identity,” I 
take him to be pointing to the way that whiteness becomes constitutive of 
the very sense of self of white Americans, of those who live in its 
possibilities of violence and capital gains without limits—as well as living 
with limits to their own exposure to certain types of living and labor 
conditions.28  
 
But a central feature of capitalism, like any economic system, turns on the 
distribution, accumulation, and transferal of abilities. The ability to build, 
to buy, to negotiate, to insure, or to move capital (both social and 
financial) just is, among other things, a particular economy of this way of 
distributing ability. And if the birth of the (modern) racial subject is linked 
to the history of capitalism, then this is at the same time to claim that the 
birth of the (modern) disabled subject is linked to the history of capitalism. 
One of the intellectual tasks at hand, I think, is to better see how the social 
value of any given “human” ability has become refracted through whiteness, 
which is to say, how whiteness inflects (and, certainly, infects) what any 
 
26 Ryan Fics, Personal Correspondence, October 22, 2019. I see this claim supported by disability 
scholars, and specifically disability historians, whose work has taken the intersection of racism and 
ableism as central. See, for example, the oeuvre of Chris Bell, Kim Nielsen, Nirmala Erevelles, and 
Jay T. Dolmage, among others. 
27 Smith, David Livingstone. Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate 
Others. 1st ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011. Curry, Tommy J. The Man-Not: Race, Class, 
Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2017. Harriet 
A. Washington, Medical Apartheid: The Dark History Of Medical Experimentation On Black 
Americans From Colonial Times To The Present (New York: Anchor Books, 2008); Paul A. 
Lombardo, ed., A Century Of Eugenics In America From The Indiana Experiment To The Human 
Genome Era (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011); Rana A. Hogarth, Medicalizing 
Blackness: Making Racial Differences in The Atlantic World, 1780-1840 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2017); Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine, The Oxford Handbook Of The 
History Of Eugenics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
28 Baldwin, Collected Essays, 127. 
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individual or group is taken to be able to do and whether that ability is 
held to carry any value, any capital. 
 
Sylvia Wynter explicitly links disability (both physical and intellectual) 
with the meaning of Blackness and the legacy of anti-black racism and 
settler colonialism in the US more generally. “The bottommost role of 
Black Americans in the United States is systemically produced…a parallel 
and interlinked role is also played by the category of the Poor, the jobless, 
the homeless, the ‘underdeveloped,’ all of whom, interned in their 
systemically produced poverty and expendability, are now made to 
function in the reoccupied place of the Leper of the medieval order and of 
the Mad of the monarchical, so as to actualize at the economic level the 
same dysgenic or dysselected-by-Evolution conception.”29 On my reading, 
Wynter is here claiming that white supremacy in the US has relegated 
Black Americans to disabled outcasts. This means, among other things, that 
being disabled cannot somehow offer protection for those who are black, 
as Curry’s analysis assumes in principle, whether through increased pity, 
consideration, social supports, or what have you. 
 
Focusing on Black males in America, Sylvia Wynter argues this exact 
point in her essay, “‘No Humans Involved’: An Open Letter to My 
Colleagues.” She writes, “the category of young Black males to which it 
[the category of “no human involved” used by the LAPD to refer to 
incidents involving young black males] refers, leads, whilst not overtly 
genocidal, are clearly having genocidal effects with the incarceration and 
elimination of young Black males by ostensibly normal, and everyday 
means.”30 We should ask, she suggests, why the LAPD conceives of “what 
it means to be both human and North American in the kinds of terms (i.e. to 
be White, of Euroamerican culture and descent, middle-class, college-
educated and suburban) within whose logic, the jobless and usually 
school drop-out/push-out category of young Black males can be perceived, 
 
29 Sylvia Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, 
after Man, Its Overrepresentation—an Argument," CR: The New Centennial Review 3, no. 3 (2003): 
304. 
30 See Sylvia Wynter, “No Humans Involved: An Open Letter to My Colleagues,” in Forum N.H.I.: 
Knowledge for the 21st Century, 1994. My thanks to Tommy Curry for pointing me to this reference. 
As Wynter explains, “You may have heard a radio news report which aired briefly during the days 
after the jury's acquittal of the policemen in the Rodney King beating case. The report stated that 
public officials of the judicial system of Los Angeles routinely used the acronym N.H.I. to refer to 
any case involving a breach of the rights of young Blackmales who belong to the jobless category of 
the inner city ghettoes. N. H. I. means ‘no humans involved.’” Ibid, 42. 
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and therefore behaved towards, only as the Lack of the human, the 
Conceptual Other to being North American?” White Americans can still 
be perceived to have lacks and yet be human—it is, in the light of such an 
analysis, no accident that the vast majority of disabled activists who 
helped push through the Americans with Disabilities Act were white and 
that the issue of racism, and anti-Black racism in particular, has been too 
often submerged by disability activism in the USA writ large.  
 
White supremacy, as a process and apparatus of making abled and 
disabled according to an intertwined logic of ableism and anti-Black 
racism, demands that Black bodies, especially Black male bodies, be 
rendered not as lacking or fulfilling due to their way of being in the world, 
but as lacking humanity and lacking it fundamentally. This is why Jeremey 
McDole and Tom Robinson are not seen according to the usual white logic 
of disability—they are seen instead through the white supremacist lens of 
anti-Black dehumanization. 
 
This larger economic, psycho-social observation is crucial to more 
accurately interpret how the meaning of disability shapes the meaning of 
race—which is always to say, of course, how practices of disablement 
shape practices of racialization—and the obverse. As I argue in more detail 
in the following section, the disabled body is worth less only when it is 
deemed a body that could have worth in the first place; insofar as 
Robinson’s and McDole’s humanity is already in question for the white 
jurors and police officers due to how they are racialized (and, Curry 
would heed us to remember, the specific intersection with their gender as 
well)—the meaning of disability changes. Yet, I think the analysis under 
discussion inadvertently falls prey to tropes of disability, especially that of 
disability pity, that assume the meaning of disability is in fact static.31  
 
For example, Curry writes, “Mr. McDole was murdered because the white 
officers rationalized him as a threat, a savage, and a danger to white life, 
 
31 In a personal correspondence, Tommy Curry responded to this by saying, “I see where you are 
going, but my emphasis in that essay was about how racism requires able-bodied caricatures of 
disabled Black men. So one way to think of it is to focus on the wheelchair, the other is to think of it 
as the wheelchair not existing or being seen the erasure of disability b/c the Black male is already 
always a social threat in need of disposing. I was talking about the latter.” I agree that that is the 
larger point relative to the article being cited, but I think, however, that the meaning of the 
wheelchair is a central issue here, and one that requires far more reflection if it is to be thought in a 
non-ableist way. 
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despite his confinement to a wheelchair.”32 On this logic, the derogatory 
idea that wheelchairs are confining, as opposed to freeing (which is how 
many wheelchair-using people talk about their wheelchairs) is supposed 
to counter the idea that McDole is a threat. Yet, using a wheelchair doesn’t 
preclude one from having or using a gun. Curry intends the wheelchair to 
function as an extrinsic sign that McDole can’t be threatening, but for this 
to work, the use of a wheelchair has to be understood as ontologically 
negative, as clearly signaling a lack of McDole’s abilities even when such a 
lack in fact doesn’t apply in the example.  
 
By “ontologically negative,” I follow the work of Fiona Kumari Campbell, 
who has argued that the meaning of disability, before and above all else, 
has historically been a question of lack. For Campbell, the assumption that 
being in a wheelchair elicits a “despite”—elicits an automatic relation to 
negation of the otherwise open possibilities of a person—is nothing more 
than ableism. It is an assumption based upon the idea that fitting the 
fictive ideal of “able-bodied” is always already better than being 
“disabled” and that to be anything but “able-bodied” is to be missing 
something. This ontological negativity bears not simply on how bodies are 
interpreted, but also on how they are experienced—and in that respect, it 
bears upon how bodies are. That is to say, it is only through an ableist 
logic that McDole being in a wheelchair can be conceived as potentially or 
assuredly protecting him from the violence of white supremacy. By seeing 
the way in which ableism and anti-Black racism are inextricably 
intertwined, the fact that his being disabled in that way is rendered moot 
becomes, on the contrary, expected. 
 
To drive this point home, let us assume that one has one leg, not two. To 
take up one’s body as lacking is to agree the idea that bodies must have 
two legs, that “normal” bodies simply eo ipso have two legs. It is to take up 
one’s body in light of a particular ontology of human form and function. 
On such a view, one can hold up the value of difference as much as they 
want, but the underlying logic is nevertheless one of lack. This is so 
ingrained in us, so “common sense,” that the idea that we would think of 
someone born with one leg, or who ends up with one leg due to any 
number of events, as having a “normal” human body is seen as absurd. 
This is despite the fact that an extremely wide range of socio-political 
philosophy has actively argued against the idea that human rights, moral 
 
32 Ibid, 339. 
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worth, and the like, should have anything to do with the form or function 
of one’s body. To put things bluntly, the concepts of humanity and 
normality are in conflict.  
 
Still, the value and conceptual inertia of normality and the way it shapes 
our thinking, even against our better angels, is hard to overstate. And, I 
hope to have demonstrated, normality is not merely a question of the 
binary ability/disability, but also of white/black. For the purposes of this 
study, I have focused on the relationship of these two binaries, though I 
think the binary ability/disability extends to a far greater set of cases and 
problematics. Ableism powerfully and essentially intersects with anti-
Black racism in the United States, but that is by no means the only 
ethically, socio-politically, historically, et al., reproachable system with 
which it interacts.  
 
To return to the death of Jeremey McDole and to be very clear, I’m not 
arguing that the police should have thought McDole a threat because 
people in wheelchairs are just as likely to have guns. My aim is to explore 
how the deeply problematic medical model of disability slips into an 
otherwise insightful and needed intersectional analysis provided by 
Curry. Namely, the model on which disability is an individual tragedy 
resulting from genetic or environmental accident: disability as lack, as 
something automatically suffered and causing disadvantage. Ableism—in 
short, the idea that being able-bodied and “normal” is automatically better 
than being disabled and “abnormal” and that it affords one more 
“abilities”—is hard to root out. 
 
One should note here the ways in which a problematic assumption about 
disability refracts back onto questions of racialization. To better 
understand this process, consider the definition of ableism provided by 
Talila A. Lewis: ableism is  
 
a system that places value on people’s bodies and minds based on 
societally constructed ideas of normalcy, intelligence, and 
excellence. These constructed ideas of normalcy, intelligence, and 
excellence are deeply rooted in anti-Blackness, eugenics, and 
capitalism. This form of systemic oppression leads to people and 
society determining who is valuable and worthy based on people’s 
appearance and/or their ability to satisfactorily produce, excel, and 
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‘behave.’ You do not have to be disabled to experience ableism.33 
 
Noting that “disability is disproportionately represented in every single 
marginalized group,” Lewis further argues that “the root of racism is 
ableism; and the root of ableism is anti-Blackness.”  
 
It is with such considerations in mind that I argue that white supremacy 
can be productively understood as a process and apparatus of making abled 
and disabled. This process and apparatus functions thanks to a simple, yet 
potent understanding of human bodies as capable of ontological lack, as 
capable of being less than human. Within the Western intellectual tradition, 
the meaning of disability has been defined primarily in one manner: lack 
or privation.34 The idea of ontological lack—etymologically built into the 
very term ‘dis-ability’—keeps the gears of ableism-racism churning as a 
primary driver of dehumanization.35 
II.  Bodies That Lack – On Racialization/Disablement 
Curry, riffing off Wynter, writes, “to be non-white is to be abnormal—
evolutionarily behind—in the phylogenetic order of human development. 
Those who are raced have historically been constructed as the 
degenerate/inferior/nonhuman opposite to the rational prototype of the 
human/superior/(Western) (abled) human” (322). If one accepts the idea 
that whiteness and white racism function as a system of ablement and 
disablement, then there is an important sense in which (a) white (anti-
Black) racism is constitutively formed by ableism and (b) ableism is 
constitutively formed by white (anti-Black) racism.  
In a phrase, ability is white, which is to say, racism and ableism function by 
situating whiteness and ability as full, actual, and present humanity and 
non-whiteness and disability as partial, potential, or non-humanity. As 
Fiona Kumari Campbell contends: 
We need to keep returning continually to the matter of disability as 
negative ontology, a malignancy, a body constituted by what 
 
33 Talila A. Lewis, Blog, https://www.talilalewis.com/blog, accessed Sep. 1, 2019. She asks that if 
one cites this definition, they mention that this is a working definition grounded in community 
work and conversation with other disabled activists and scholars. 
34 Joel Michael Reynolds, The Life Worth Living: Pain, Disability, and the History of Morality. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming.  
35 Smith, Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others. 
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Michael Oliver terms ‘the personal tragedy theory of disability,’ 
wherein […] ‘disability is some terrible chance event which occurs 
at random to unfortunate individuals.’ Disability is assumed to be 
ontologically intolerable, inherently negative. Such an attitude of 
mind underpins most claims of social injury within the welfare 
state and is imbricated in compensatory initiatives and the 
compulsion towards therapeutic interventions. The presence of 
disability, I argue, upsets the modernist craving for ontological 
security.36    
The “bad,” “corrupted,” “defective,” “malignant,” or “abnormal” body is 
one whose worth is always already judged as less, one whose worth is 
certain enough to often end or curtail its own possibility. None of this 
makes sense without the assumption that bodies are the sorts of thing that 
can lack and that, correlatively, there is such a thing as normality, as the 
“normal” human.37  
Let us not forget, as disability historian Douglas Baynton reminds us, that 
“a common argument for slavery was that the impaired intelligence of 
African Americans made them incapable of equality with other 
Americans. Medical authorities explained that it is the ‘a deficiency of 
cerebral matter in the cranium, and an excess of nervous matter 
distributed to the organs of sensation and assimilation, [caused] that 
debasement of mind, which has rendered the people of Africa unable to 
take care of themselves.’ Education was ‘at the expense of the body, 
shortening the existence,’ resulting in bodies ‘dwarfed or destroyed’ by 
unnatural exertion.”38 Similar arguments were made to keep patriarchal 
and misogynist systems in place.39 
 
36 Fiona Kumari Campbell, "Inciting Legal Fictions: 'Disability's' Date with Ontology and the 
Ableist Body of Law," Griffith Law Review 42 (2001): 43. See also her Contours of Ableism: The 
Production of Disability and Abledness (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).  
37 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture 
and Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 
38  Douglas Baynton, “Disability and the Justification of Inequality in American History,” in The 
New Disability History: American Perspectives, ed. P. K. Longmore and Lauri Umansky (New York: 
New York University Press, 2001), 33–57. 
39 “During the debate over women’s suffrage, suffrage opponents pointed to women’s physical, 
intellectual, and psychological defects. Paralleling slavery arguments, they claimed both that 
women’ disabilities made them incapable of equality and that its burden would result in even 
greater disability. Their ‘great temperamental disabilities,’ the fact that ‘woman lacks endurance in 
things mental,’ that ‘she lacks nervous stability,’ meant that political participation would lead to 
‘nervous prostration’ and ‘hysteria.’ A prominent neurophysiologist, Charles L. Dana, estimated 
that enfranchising women would increase insanity among them…" (idem). 
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 They were also used as means of nation-building and to control the 
power of citizenship. Jay Timothy Dolmage reports that  
When Ellis Island surgeon E. H. Mullan later wrote about the 
mental inspection process for Public Health Reports, he 
emphasized the ways that the mental and the physical overlapped, 
and the ways that “feeble-mindedness” might be a way to enforce 
racial typing and exclusion as well. Mullan wrote that “the physical 
details in the medical inspection of immigrants have been dwelt on 
at some length, and necessarily so, because a sizing up of the 
mentality is not complete without considering them. Speech, pupil 
symptoms, goiters, palsies, atrophies, scars, skin lesions, gaits, and 
other physical signs, all have their meaning in mental medicine. . . 
Knowledge of racial characteristics in physique, costume and 
behavior are important in this primary sifting process.” Mullan 
[reinforced] the idea that any good American should be able to co-
identify racial, mental, and physical deficiency, suggesting that 
“experience enables the inspecting officer to tell at a glance the race 
of an alien. . .”40  
Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault and Ladelle McWhorter and 
specifically focusing upon Foucault’s claim that racism is “racism against 
the abnormal,” Shelly Tremain has argued that “within modern racist 
regimes of power, nonwhite skin and non-Christian religious and cultural 
affiliation are marked as abnormal, but so too are (for example) low IQ 
test scores, seizures, cleft palates, intersex, trans identity, and same-gender 
coupling.”41 Authors like Curry, Wynter, and Tremain bring to light the 
potent historical and contemporary links between colonialist processes of 
racialization and processes of disablement/debility. These links are all the 
more worrisome in the specific context of the United States, where late 
nineteenth/early twentieth century eugenics programs promoted 
themselves openly and proudly in terms of a twinned racist and ableist 
imaginary.42  
 
40 Jay Timothy Dolmage, Disabled Upon Arrival: Eugenics, Immigration, and the Construction of Race 
and Disability, Columbus: Ohio State University (2018). 
41 Shelley Tremain, Foucault and Feminist Philosophy of Disability (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2017), 71. 
42  Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, "Eugenics," in Keywords for Disability Studies, ed. Rachel Adams, 
David Serlin, and Benjamin Reiss (New York: NYU Press, 2015); Douglas Baynton, "Disability and 
the Justification of Inequality in American History," in The New Disability History: American 
Perspectives, ed. P. K. Longmore and Lauri Umansky (New York: New York University Press, 2001). 
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At the same time, however, many scholars have been understandably 
wary to analogize between or otherwise draw out loose similarities 
between the types of oppressions and discriminations faced by people 
along lines of race, on the one hand, and disability, on the other. For 
example, Shelley Tremain argues, “the assumption that ableism and the 
exclusion of disabled philosophers from the profession are produced 
through the same techniques and mechanisms as the exclusion of non-
disabled philosophers (however gendered and racialized)—obscures the 
distinct forms of discrimination that disabled philosophers confront.”43 
This obscuration runs deep. Erevelles and Kafer note that “for example, 
Deaf/disability studies likens disability experiences to that of race, while 
race theorists describe their own oppression as disability. In each case, 
rather than interrogate the relationship, each group borrows other’s 
oppressive associations in an attempt to explain its own oppression.”44 
This is, it seems to me, a reason why some of the best contemporary 
intersectional work between ableism and racism fights against analogy, 
instead arguing for a critical juxtaposition.45 
While there is no question that claims concerning the lived experience of 
Black Americans and disabled Americans obtain in crucial and at times 
incommensurable ways, this is not to say that the more general logics 
behind racialization and disablement, or the logics behind whiteness and 
ablebodiedness, may not be similar in informative ways. It is also not to 
say that their larger function, the primary goals they serve in our society 
as a whole, may not be similar—at minimum with respect to he ways in 
which they underwrite white supremacy.46 As Cornel West has put it, 
“ableism is as evil as racism, sexism, anti-Semitism and anti-Arabism,” 
 
43 Shelley Tremain, Foucault and Feminist Philosophy of Disability (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2017). 36. 
44 Erevelles, Nirmala and Alison Kafer, 2010, “Committed Critique: An Interview with Nirmala 
Erevelles”, in Susan Burch and Alison Kafer (eds.), Deaf and Disability Studies, Washington, DC: 
Gallaudet University Press, 217. 
45 See Desiree Valentine, The Curious Case of Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank: Centering a 
Political Ontology of Race and Disability for Liberatory Thought, Journal of Speculative Philosophy 34 
(3):424-440 (2020). 
46 Linda Alcoff notes that there is an overall “lack of analogy between racial/ethnic/cultural 
identities, on the one hand, and identities such as age, disability, and sex on the other. All are 
generally visible identities, naturalized as marked on the body without mediation. But the 
markings that signify age, disability, and sex are qualitatively different in significance from those 
signifying race, ethnicity, and culture.” But in the footnote to this sentence, she qualifies her 
statement: “In regard to disability, this is an ongoing debate.” Linda Alcoff, Visible Identities: Race, 
Gender, and the Self, Studies in Feminist Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 165. 
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and it is worth questioning what formal similarities underwrite such 
forms of injustice, just as it is worth questioning their distinct differences.47 
I hope that this study, and the insights of the many resources upon which 
I have drawn, leads one to ask: “Is ableness a necessary condition for 
racist stereotypes of Black Americans and both racist and misandric 
stereotypes of Black males in particular? And if it is, what does the 
disabled Black person mean/represent in the mind of whites to not fulfill 
those stereotypes of Blackness as savage and predatory?”48 
III.  Today’s (Yesterday’s) Eugenics 
I have explored the connection of anti-Black racism and ableism in the 
context of the US, arguing that these ideologies are inextricable from one 
another, especially with respect to their function to confer or deny 
humanity to human beings. Eugenics is always already racialized 
eugenics, as Fanon and Foucault suggested decades ago, and I hope to 
have added to details of such a claim how white supremacy is always 
already able-bodied supremacy. The racialized and ableist eugenics of 
mass incarceration, police murders, and systemic gun violence are of a 
kind with policies intended to systematically strip social supports from 
economically-insecure citizens and redistribute wealth upwards, as 
codified in the most recent tax bill.49 These in some respects “velvet 
eugenics,” to borrow Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s phrasing, are also of 
a kind growing state and federal-level attempts to weaken the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, undermine equal access to education on multiple 
fronts, and destabilize just forms of care for people with disabilities, 
including our quickly growing aging population. This is the form “racism 
against the abnormal” today takes in the USA.  
 
As historian Michael Rembis notes in his contribution, “The New 
Asylums,” to the 2014 volume Disability Incarcerated, “punitive (carceral) 
 
47 The quote from Cornel West is taken from Mel Duncan, “From Our Community: Race/Disability 
Are Starting Points for Redemption,” Access Press: Minnesota’s Disability Community News 
Source, Jan. 8, 2016, http://tinyurl.com/z9uavg3. 
48 My thanks to Tommy Curry for these two questions. Tommy Curry, Personal Correspondence, 
August 1, 2019. 
49 Public law no. 115-97. Liat Ben-Moshe, "Disabling Incarceration: Connecting Disability to 
Divergent Confinements in the USA," Critical Sociology 39, no. 3 (2013); Liat Ben-Moshe, Chris 
Chapman, and Allison C. Carey, Disability Incarcerated: Imprisonment and Disability in the United 
States and Canada (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. 
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solutions to medical problems show no signs of abating largely because 
politicians on both the left and right continue to support neoliberal fiscal 
policies that slash domestic spending on health, education, and welfare, 
while leaving fiscal support for law enforcement nearly untouched. State 
budgets for mental health care, which have been declining steadily (in the 
aggregate) since the 1970s, have fallen by an additional $2 billion since 
2008.”50 Writing specifically about US state laws concerning guardianship, 
political theorist Andrew Dilts argues, “there is a deeper and more 
prevalent connection between race and disability [than mere assumptions 
about “ability” tacked to each], and it has in part to do with the formation 
and maintenance of racial categories marked expressly through mental 
disability and criminality.”51 Put more provocatively, if the legal, social, 
and political framework set up via white settler colonialist institutions has 
long understood race and disability intersectionally, perhaps scholars 
should more carefully attend to doing the same.  
 
If critical philosophy of race is not to unwittingly reinforce ableist 
ideologies that, in theory and in praxis, underwrite racism and especially 
anti-Black racism in the context of the US and if philosophy of disability is 
not to unwittingly reinforce racist ideologies that, in theory and praxis, 
underwrite ableism and especially anti-Black ableism in the context of the 
US, then scholars in each of these fields need to do more work to 
understand the intersection of practices of racialization and 
ability/disability/debility. If, as Talila Lewis argues, ableism is a system 
that fundamentally shapes modern societies and is an integral facet of 
racism—and specifically anti-Black racism—then taking into account how 
white supremacy functions as a process and apparatus of making abled 
and disabled valuable might prove a coalitional tool in fights for social 
justice more generally. 
  
 
50 Michael Rembis, “The New Asylums,” in Ben-Moshe, Chapman, and Carey, Disability 
Incarcerated: Imprisonment and Disability in the United States and Canada, 149. But if, as he also argues 
a bit in that piece, “the move from asylum to jail or prison…is the direct result of the increasing 
medicalization and biologization of madness in the late twentieth century,” then it seems that 
debates over the materiality of disability, including intellectual disability, are a discursive field in 
which the materiality of criminality cannot but play out—and the reverse as well (150). 
51 Andrew Dilts, “Incurable Blackness: Criminal Disenfranchisement, Mental Disability, and the 




Al-Saji, Alia. "Too Late: Racialized Time and the Closure of the Past." 
Insights 6, no. 5 (2013). 
Alcoff, Linda. Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self. Studies in 
Feminist Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness. Revised edition / ed. New York; Tennessee: New Press, 
2012. 
Baldwin, James. Collected Essays. New York: Library of America, 1998. 
Baynton, Douglas. "Disability and the Justification of Inequality in 
American History." In The New Disability History: American Perspectives, 
edited by P. K. Longmore and Lauri Umansky, 33-57. New York: New 
York University Press, 2001. 
Bell, Christopher M. Blackness and Disability: Critical Examinations and 
Cultural Interventions. Forecaast. East Lansing: Michigan State University 
Press, 2011. 
———. "Introducing White Disability Studies: A Modest Proposal." In The 
Disability Studies Reader, edited by Lennard J. Davis, 2006. 
Ben-Moshe, Liat. "Disabling Incarceration: Connecting Disability to 
Divergent Confinements in the USA." Critical Sociology 39, no. 3 (2013): 
385-403. 
Ben-Moshe, Liat, Chris Chapman, and Allison C. Carey. Disability 
Incarcerated: Imprisonment and Disability in the United States and Canada. 
New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
Campbell, Fiona Kumari. Contours of Ableism: The Production of Disability 
and Abledness. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
———. "Inciting Legal Fictions: 'Disability's' Date with Ontology and the 
Ableist Body of Law." Griffith Law Review 42 (2001): 42-62. 
Chen, Mel Y. Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect. 
Perverse Modernities. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012. 
Curry, Tommy J. The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black 
Manhood. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2017. 
———. "This Nigger's Broken: Hyper-Masculinity, the Buck, and the Role 
of Physical Disability in White Anxiety toward the Black Male Body." 
Journal of Social Philosophy 48, no. 3 (2017): 321-43. 
Dolmage, Jay Timothy. Disabled Upon Arrival: Eugenics, Immigration, and 
the Construction of Race and Disability. Columbus: Ohio State University 
(2018). 
 20 
Dilts, Andrew. "Incurable Blackness: Criminal Disenfranchisement, 
Mental Disability, and the White Citizen." DSQ 32, no. 3 (2012). 
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press, 2008. 
Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie. "Eugenics." In Keywords for Disability 
Studies, edited by Rachel Adams, David Serlin and Benjamin Reiss, 215-26. 
New York: NYU Press, 2015. 
———. Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture 
and Literature. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. 
Hamraie, Aimi. Building Access: Universal Design and the Politics of 
Disability. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2017. 
Kafer, Alison. Feminist, Queer, Crip. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 2013. 
Kittay, Eva Feder. "Deadly Medicine: Project T4, Mental Disability, and 
Racism." Res Philosophica 93, no. 4 (2016): 715-41. 
Lee, Harper. To Kill a Mockingbird. 1st Perennial Classic ed. New York: 
HarperCollins, 2002. 
Mbembe, Achille. Critique of Black Reason. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2017. 
Puar, Jasbir K. The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability. [in English] 
2017. 
Schalk, Sami. Bodyminds Reimagined: (Dis)Ability, Race, and Gender in Black 
Women's Speculative Fiction. London: Duke University Press, 2018. 
Schweik, Susan. "Lomax's Matrix: Disability, Solidarity, and the Black 
Power of 504." DSQ 31, no. 1 (2011). 
Scuro, Jennifer. Addressing Ableism: Philosophical Questions via 
Disability Studies. Lanham: Lexington, 2014. 
Simplican, Stacy Clifford. The Capacity Contract: Intellectual Disability and 
the Question of Citizenship. Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2015. 
Smith, David Livingstone. Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and 
Exterminate Others. 1st ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011. 
Smith, Phil. "Whitness, Normal Theory, and Disability Studies." DSQ 24, 
no. 2 (2004). 
Tremain, Shelley. Foucault and Feminist Philosophy of Disability. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2017. 
Valentine, Desiree. The Curious Case of Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm 
Bank: Centering a Political Ontology of Race and Disability for Liberatory 
Thought, Journal of Speculative Philosophy 34 (3):424-440 (2020). 
Wynter, Sylvia. "Unsettling the Coloniality of 
Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, after Man, Its 
 21 
Overrepresentation—an Argument." CR: The New Centennial Review 3, no. 
3 (2003): 257-337. 
Yancy, George. Backlash: What Happens When We Talk Honestly About 
Racism in America. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018. 
 
